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CORPORATE LAW-CHIPPING AWAY AT THE DELAWARE 
BLOCK: A CRITIQUE OF THE DELAWARE BLOCK ApPROACH TO THE 
VALUATION OF DISSENTERS' SHARES IN ApPRAISAL PROCEEDINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When certain major corporate transactions occur, such as 
merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all assets, every 
state provides dissatisfied or dissenting shareholders with a statutory 
appraisal process.! During the appraisal process a court, or its ap­
pointed appraiser,2 will ascertain the value of the dissenters' shares, 
and a court will order the corporation to purchase those shares at the 
judicially assessed amount. 3 Unfortunately, legislatures have offered 
little guidance in the valuation of corporate shares.4 
1. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. The events required to trigger such 
provisions vary from state to state. All states include merger and consolidation. However, 
some states do not provide appraisal rights in the event of a sale of assets. E.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN., tit. 8, §§ 262(a) and (b) (1983). A discussion of the mechanics involved in invoking 
appraisal rights is beyond the scope of this note. Interested readers are referred to W. 
FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 372-80 (1972). 
2. While some states require a court appraisal of the dissenter's shares, see, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983), many other states allow the court to appoint an ap­
praiser or board of appraisers. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-210(a) 
(1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:II-8(c) (West 1969); TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN., art. 
5.12C (Vernon 1980). In those states, where judicially appointed appraisers are allowed, 
the appraiser's findings are subject to review. See, e.g., In re Bickerton v. N.Y. Theatre Co., 
232 N.Y. I, 133 N.E. 41 (1921) (New York no longer permits court appointed appraisals); 
Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 163 N.E.2d 9 (1959). 
3. States vary as to whether appraisal is a dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy. 
In some states, the matter is still unresolved and has fed a debate which has lasted more 
than fifty years. Lattin, Remedies ofDissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 233, 244-51 (1931). While some commentators argue that appraisal is an 
exclusive remedy, see Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 223 (1962), others maintain that it is not. See Vorenberg, Exclusive­
ness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964); Com­
ment, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Freeze-Outs: Questions of Valuation and 
ExclusiVity, 38 Sw. L. J. 775, 790-97 (1984). For additional commentary on the exclusivity 
of the appraisal remedy, see Macrae, Dissenting Stockholders' Rights in Virginia: Exclusiv­
ity of the Cash-Out Remedy and Determination of "Fair Value", 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 505 
(1978); Wolf, Dissenting Shareholders: Is the Statutory Appraisal Remedy Exclusive?, 42 
TEX. L. REV. 58 (1963). 
4. See infra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. Surprisingly, many courts resolved 
the matter of what was taken similarly. Courts agreed that what was being taken was an 
individual's aliquot share in a going concern. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 
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Originally, courts and appraisers would use one of three methods 
of valuing stock (or business enterprises): net asset value,s net earn­
ings value,6 and market value.7 The majority of courts have now come 
to accept, however, "an eclectic or compromise theory of appraisal, 
whereby the value of the business is supposed to depend to some ex­
tent" on each of the above three methods.8 The appraiser first obtains 
a value from each of the three methods, then weights those values ac­
cording to the facts of a particular case.9 This method is known in 
common parlance as the "Delaware block approach"l0 or the "weight­
150, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934); In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). "What he 
has been deprived of," said one court, "is his proportional share of an active enterprise 
which but for the compulsion of others he could continue to be associated with [indefi­
nitely]." Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934). The 
value of a share in a going concern "represents the amount [the dissenter] would have 
received as a stockholder in one way or another as long as the company continued in busi­
ness." Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 534, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. 1950). 
Going concern value represents "the added increment of value which attaches to a 
business by virtue of the way in which its individual assets and components are arranged 
and utilized in conjunction with each other," and is distinguishable from the concept of 
good will. Glosband v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 21 BANKR. 963, 976 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1981). See also In re Nathanson Bros. Co., 64 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1933) ("addi­
tional element of value [that] attaches to property, considered in the aggregate, by reason of 
its having been assembled for the conduct of the given business and its fitness for such 
use"); North Clackamas Community Hosp. v. Harris, 664 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1980)(an 
additional but intangible element of value, distinct from goodwill, that attaches to property 
by reason of its integrated use by an operating enterprise). 
[Going concern value] has a kind of internal focus, as it is the added increment of 
value which attaches to a business by virtue of the way in which its individual 
assets and components are arranged and utilized in conjunction with each other. 
The concept of good will, on the other hand, has a more external focus, as it is 
derived from the attitude of customers and potential customers by virtue of the 
history of past performance by a company. 
Glosband, 21 BANKR. at 976. Accounting Principles Board Opinion Number 17 concerns 
methods of accounting for intangible assets and has been interpreted to include goodwill. 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL 
PRONOUNCEMENTS ISSUED THROUGH JUNE 1973, APB Opinion No. 17 (1984-85) [herein­
after cited as PRONOUNCEMENTS]' APB 17 suggests an alternative interpretation of good­
will which provides that the premium a purchaser pays for the acquisition of an enterprise 
represents goodwill. Id. at 11 24. 
5. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. 
8. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 233 (1937)(Professor Bonbright did 
not contend, however, that such means were to be averaged). 
9. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
10. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). While courts have 
used the Delaware block approach in appraisal valuations for roughly forty years, see infra 
note 12 and accompanying text, the technique was not so epithetized until the last decade. 
The approach had been known before as the weighting method and was enormously popu­
lar in Delaware where, until the 1983 Weinberger decision, courts recognized it as the 
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ing method."l1 For roughly forty years, courts have commonly in­
voked the Delaware block approach to valuation with little or no 
justification. 12 In recent years, a small number of critics have emerged 
to question the accuracy and reliability of the Delaware block 
approach. 13 
This essay will first provide a brief history of appraisal rights. 
Second, the essay will describe how the Delaware block approach is 
used as a valuation technique in light of the objectives of the appraisal 
statutes in order to establish a foundation on which to examine the 
effectiveness of the statutes. The basic thesis of this essay is that the 
Delaware block approach is an inaccurate and suspect means of valua­
tion which often undervalues corporate shares. Lastly, this essay sug­
gests that a better alternative exists, which is more accurate than the 
Delaware block approach and more complementary to the objectives 
of the appraisal statutes. Specifically, the essay advocates the use of 
the discounted cash flow method as a more accurate means of valuing 
dissenters' shares. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Appraisal Rights 
In the mid-nineteenth century, before the time of the great 
exclusive appraisal valuation method and accorded it significant precedential reverence. 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983); see also Rosenblatt v. Getty 
Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 934 & n.6 (Del. 1985). Oddly enough, the U.S. District Court of 
Hawaii was the first to refer to the weighting method adopted in Delaware as the Delaware 
block approach: 
. . . those stock appraisal situations wherein what this court calls the Delaware 
"block" weighting methodology is used, i.e., the market price, investment value, 
and net asset value methods . . . are independently blocked off and separately 
valued. Then these "block" values are each weighted to obtain a final valuation 
figure. 
Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Amfac, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 116, 125 (D. Hawaii 
1973)(Pence, c.J.). The Hawaiian court's lingo was slow in catching on, but after ten 
years, courts, commentators, and practitioners have come to accept the denomination. See. 
e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil 
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 931 (Del. 1985); Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 
719, 724, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1979); Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 
S.W.2d 659, 668 n.1 (Tenn. 1983); Comment, supra note 3, at 779; Kanda & Levmore, The 
Appraisal Remedy and the Goals 0/ Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 439 n. 36 
(1985); 12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 
§ 5906.12 (1984). 
11. Schaefer, The Fallacy 0/ Weighting Asset Value and Earnings Value in the Ap­
praisal a/Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1932). 
12. [d. at 1033. 
13. See generally. id. (the fallacy of the approach lies in its requirement that separate 
and competing values be compromised). Comment, supra note 3, at 777-88. 
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trusts,14 corporations were ordinarily small, relatively unsophisticated 
organizations I 5 resembling in many respects a closely knit partner­
ship.16 With the tremendous growth of working capital in the late 
nineteenth century and the expansion of corporate enterprise, the 
common law that had evolved to regulate the affairs of smaller, more 
traditional businesses proved inadequate for the larger concerns of the 
industrial boomP At common law, for instance, since "one share­
holder in a corporation could block all others from making any funda­
mental change in the corporation's business,"18 unanimous consent of 
the shareholders was necessary in most jurisdictions to effectuate basic 
changes. 19 The corporate charter was seen as a contract among the 
14. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 221, 221-26 (1956); I E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, § 3.11 at 106 
(1980); F. FETTER, THE MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931). For more thorough com­
mentary on the great trusts, see D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN EcONOMICS AND LAW (1959); 
W. RIPLEY, TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS (1905). 
15. Levy, Rights ofDissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CORNELL 
L. Q. 420, 420 (1930). 
16. Id. The author intentionally qualifies the term "partnership" since, to practition­
ers and scholars in the field of business law, it is not necessarily true that partnerships are 
small and unsophisticated. Unlike the partnerships of Professor Levy's day, modem part­
nerships are often large and highly complex enterprises. Basile, Admission of Additional 
and Substitute General Partners to a Limited Partnership: A Proposal for Freedom ofCon­
tract, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 235, 236 & n.3 (1984). The image intended is that of a "Ma 
and Pa's General Store": a small enterprise composed of very few shareholders and possi­
bly fewer still who actively manage the business. See Note, Valuation ofDissenting Share­
holders' Interests in a Merged or Consolidated Corporation, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 985, 985 
(1933). 
17. See generally Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 
547 (1927)(common law requirements were too inflexible to accommodate change). 
18. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N. Y. U. L. 
REV. 624, 627 (1981). 
19. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Clearwater v. 
Meredith, 68 U.S.(1 Wall.) 25, 39-41 (1864); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401, 408-09 
(1853); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 582-84 (N.Y. 1861); See also 
Weiss, supra note 18, at 627; Note, Valuation ofDissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (1966); Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining 
"Fair Value" Under the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 427 (1981). 
Not all corporate actions required unanimous consent, rather only those that went beyond 
the scope of corporate powers. Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625, 630 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). 
Professor Lattin referred to the unanimity requirement as the rule of Natusch v. Irving. 
N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 571 & n. 4, 576 (2d ed. 1971). The Natusch case 
involved a partnership, and from that case evolved the principle, later applied to corpora­
tions, that unanimous action of the partners was necessary in order to alter the partnership 
contract. Natusch v. Irving, 47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (1824). The rule of Natusch flourished as 
an unbudging majority rule well toward the close of the nineteenth century. See. e.g., Ab­
bot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 582-84 (N.Y. 1861). The monolithic rule 
began to crumble at the tum of the century in the face of the surging spirit of economic 
boom. The rule was echoed in Professor Thompson's monumental treatise on corporate 
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shareholders through which each shareholder was granted certain 
vested rights,20 including control of major corporate affairs.21 While 
corporate actions wrought without unanimous consent were ultra 
vires, courts often refused to nullify them and effectively provided the 
corporation with a means offreezing out a troublesome minority.22 A 
frozen out shareholder's only remedy was a suit at law, usually for 
conversion, or in equity against the corporation.23 
Common law principles proved unduly burdensome to large cor­
porations consisting of many shareholders and, in effect, hindered eco­
nomic growth both for the companies and the country.24 Jurists and 
scholars first saw the need for appraisal rights during an early twenti­
eth century utilitarian trend away from individual protections toward 
group rights or majoritarianism.25 Substantial economic justification 
law. I S. THOMPSON & J. THOMPSON, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CoRPORATIONS, 
§ 395, at 494-95 (3d ed. 1927)(first edition published in 1908). On the other hand, Machen 
stated in his treatise "[t]hat the majority rules is axiomatic in the law of corporations." 2 
A. MACHEN, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS, sec. 1296, at 1075 
(1908)(Machen qualifies the rule with such limits as validity, legality, and fairness). Thus, 
two authorities writing approximately at the same time arrived at different conclusions, 
certainly evidence of the uncertainty of the state of the law at the tum of the century. 
20. The doctrine of vested rights which mandated unanimous consent derived from 
old and well established principles of contract law. Weiss, supra note 18, at 627. 
21. [d.; Note, supra note 19, at 1453. Unanimous consent was necessary for such 
changes as a sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets, a change in the nature 
of the business by charter amendment, a merger or consolidation, or a change in the corpo­
ration's capitalization. Levy, supra note 15, at 420. 
22. See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); Tan­
ner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. I, 79 S.W. ISS (1904); Wunsch v. Consolidated Laundry Co., 
116 Wash. 44, 198 P. 383 (1921). 
23. Weiner, supra note 17, at 562; Lattin, supra note 3, at 234 n.1 (1931). In such 
actions "[t]he minority stockholders are ... entitled to demand their fair share of the 
transaction and to be placed upon terms of equality with the majority." Tanner v. Lindell 
Ry., 180 Mo. 1,21,79 S.W. ISS, 159 (1904)(citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
PLEADINGS, § 1261-62 (8th ed. 1870». 
24. Levy, supra note 15, at 420. For a history of the business corporation in light of 
social and economic issues, see J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA­
TION (1970)(corporations, between 1890 and 1930, were increasingly seen as valuable en­
gines of economic growth, and the desire for such growth served as a considerable 
justification for abandoning the unanimity requirement). The common law restrictions on 
the majority were seen increasingly as "serious impediments to the sweeping reorganiza­
tions in structure which modem needs had made the order of the day." 12B W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.1 at 342. 
25. Manning, supra note 3, at 226-27; see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MOD­
ERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68, 112-16 (1932) (in the evolution of busi­
ness enterprises, the increasing growth in businesses necessitated a dislocation of the three 
entrepreneurial functions of business structure (1) ownership of interests in business, (2) 
having power over it, and (3) involvement in operations traditionally seated in the individ­
ual, such that the proprietor first became separated from an active operational role, i.e., 
with the advent of a general partner, and finally became separated from control itself, i.e., 
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supported such a change.26 In order to create a business environment 
conducive to economic expansion, legislatures in most states either ab­
rogated or modified the common law doctrine of vested rights among 
shareholders, thereby permitting corporate governance by the major­
ity.27 Yet some courts held such statutes invalid insofar as they failed 
to provide the dissenters with cash payments.28 Consequently,legisla­
in the modem corporation). Simply put, the needs of the many came to outweigh the needs 
of the few. For interesting discussions of majority power and the protection of minority 
interests, see Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929); Kava­
naugh v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); and Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 
Mo. 1,79 S.W. 155 (1904). 
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The trend proved appealing for polit­
ical and historical reasons as well. See infra note 27; Manning, supra note 3, at 226-27. 
27. Thompson, Squeeze-Out Mergers and the "New" Appraisal Remedy, 62 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 415, 417-18 (1984); 12 B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.1. One force behind 
the abrogation of the unanimity rule is said to have come from the once fashionable trend 
of associating political theory with corporate governance. Manning, supra note 3, at 226. 
Thus, an oft-cited reason for the abrogation of the common law rule and a counterbalanc­
ing provision for appraisal rights is a peculiarly American preference for rule by the major­
ity majoritarianism - on the one hand, and a desire to protect a dissident minority once a 
system of majority rule is established on the other. Id. at 226-27. See also Letter from 
Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 16, 19-21 
(Boyd ed. 1958)("lt is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacri­
ficed to the many."). 
Majoritarianism also served to lessen significantly the very real problem under the 
unanimity rule of tyranny of the minority. Such "tyranny" often arose in the form of 
blackmail whereby individuals holding relatively few shares would stonewall the desires of 
the majority unless they were convinced, by the proper consideration, to join the majority. 
This gave a few shares a significant "nuisance value." See In re Shore, 67 A.D.2d 526,531, 
415 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882 (1979)(citing Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 
n.6 (1941); In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 181,93 N.E. 522, 523 (1910); 12B W. FLETCHER, 
supra note 10, § 5906.1; Note, The Dissenting Shareholders' Appraisal Statute: Influence of 
Cost and Interest Provisions Upon the Efficacy of the Remedy, 50 B.U.L. REV. 57 (1970». 
See also Thompson, supra note 27, at 417. 
The problem of minorities holding back corporate expansion must have been signifi­
cant, since in some states the courts modified the common law requirement of unanimity 
well before legislative action to provide for majority rule where transactions were fair. See 
Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913); Bowditch v. 
Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 A. 1014 (1912); Cohen v. Big Stone Gap Iron Co., III Va. 
468,69 S.E. 359 (1910). Such was especially so in industrial states, where the courts were 
protective of corporate expansion. "At common law," one court maintained, "the right of 
corporations, acting by a majority of their stockholders, to sell their property is absolute, 
and is not limited as to objects, circumstances or quantity." Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. 
Co., 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 393, 404 (1856). 
28. Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912). Cf Hale v. 
Cheshire R.R. Co., 161 Mass. 443, 37 N.E. 307 (1894) (in a case in which the legislature 
approved consolidation by special act, the court rejected the claims of dissenting sharehold­
ers seeking greater cash awards than what the majority had approved). For instance, in an 
early Pennsylvania case where the state legislature approved a railroad company merger 
without any mention of relief for the dissenters, the court reasoned that the legislature had 
meant to provide such relief but did not through careless oversight. The court then en­
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tures acted quickly to provide dissenting shareholders with some form 
of relief.29 In most jurisdictions, statutes were enacted which gave dis­
senters the right to ask "for an appraisal where no agreement as to 
joined the merger, but only until the dissenters were fairly cashed out. Lauman v. Lebanon 
Valley R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 48-49 (1858). 
29. The first statutes providing for dissenters' rights were extremely limited in scope 
as they were applicable only in cases involving railroads, ferries, piers, docks, or stockyards. 
See e.g., 1861 PA. LAWS, No. 657, at 703; N.J. ACTS 1878, ch. 49, at 59; 1883 N.J. LAWS, 
ch. 198, at 243 (cited in Manning, supra note 3, at 246 n.38). 
General provision appraisal rights statutes, such as for consolidations and mergers, 
were enacted by most states between 1896 and 1926. See, e.g., 1896 N.J. LAWS, ch. 185, 
§ 108, at 312; 21 DEL. LAWS 1899, ch. 273, § 56, at 463; 22 DEL. LAWS 1903, ch. 85, § 20 
(cited in Manning, supra note 3, at 246 n. 38. See also Weiner, supra note 17, at 547 n.2. 
While entreating the majoritarians, courts and commentators recognized the lack of 
choice forced upon the prospective dissenter and likened the dissenter's plight to that of the 
victim of a government condemnation or taking. See, e.g., Alhenius v. Bunn & Hum­
phreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155, 192 N.E. 824 (1934); Prall v. United States Leather Co., N.J. 
Misc. 967, 143 A. 382 (1928), affd, 105 N.J.L. 646, 146 A. 916 (1929); In re Morris Canal 
& Banking Co., 104 N.J.L. 526, 141 A. 784 (1928). For instance, an Illinois appraisal 
statute provided that "the practice and procedure [of appraisal valuation] thereon shall be 
the same, so far as practicable, as that under the eminent domain laws." Pridmore v. Whit­
ing Corp., 268 Ill. App. 592, 595 (1932)(cited in 2 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 829 n.40) 
(quoting ILL. ST. 1931, ch. 32, ~ 73, p. 747 (Cahill ed.». 
One commentator attempts to distinguish the two situations by arguing that (1) in 
eminent domain situations the government is paying the dislodged party from outside 
funds, while the corporation pays in the dissenter situation; and (2) in an appraisal the 
dissenter is forced to surrender a business opportunity, including more than mere assets, 
e.g., future dividends or capital gains, while an eminent domain valuation concentrates on 
asset values, "since the compensation is meant to enable the owner to obtain other tangible 
property as a substitute." Note, supra note 19, at 1455. But the underlying premises of the 
above arguments are not entirely valid. For instance, in the first argument, the taker is 
paying the dislodged party in both scenarios, and it is of little importance that the taker is 
the government in one instance and a corporation (of which the dissenter is no longer a 
part) in the other. Moreover, regarding the second argument, it is not necessarily true that 
a dislodged party is given only asset value in an eminent domain proceeding. See e.g, Kim­
ball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1945) where the court suggested that the 
dislodged party in a public taking was to be given a proportion of capitalized earnings in 
order to compensate for lost going concern value. Id. 16-21. All losses are recoverable in 
eminent domain cases as long as they are proved with reasonable certainty. 
In confronting the problem as a taking, courts and legislators were next concerned 
with what exactly was taken. See, e.g., In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 
310,314,367 P.2d 807, 810 (1962); Alhenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 155, 192 
N.E. 824 (1934); In re Northwest Greyhound Lines, Inc., 41 Wash. 2d 672,251 P.2d 607 
(1952). One commentator explains that the taking analogy jives well with the "nineteenth 
century mind's" view of the corporation and fundamental changes therein. Manning, supra 
note 3, at 244-46. Contrary to the modern view of the corporation as an "aggregation of 
human beings and economic assets, a particular kind of social organism that in this society 
carries out a variety of economic and other functions," the nineteenth century mind saw 
the corporation as a legal construct, "as something quite separate from the economic enter­
prise, three dimensional, virtually alive, a little sacred because of its 'immortality' and con­
nection with 'sovereign.''' Id. at 244-45. In short, the corporation was observed, 
discussed, and regulated in a levitated sense of abstraction, isolated from the forces with 
198 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:191 
value could be reached" between the majority and the minority share­
holders and to demand the fair cash value of their share.30 The ap­
praisal statutes raised the significant problem of determining the value 
of a share of stock.31 Today all fifty states,32 the District of Colum­
which it interacted, both socially and economically. Professor Manning provided an illus­
trative digression: 
If the Legislature created a particular corporation in the shape of a horse, the 
horse "could not" moo. It was not that the enterprise should not violate a legisla­
tive prescription; it was that the "corporation" could not do so as a matter of 
inherent capacity. The horse eschews mooing because it is not in its nature to 
moo; not because some regulatory authority has ordered it to ... whinny.... 
[Thus in] a corporate merger ... [t]he shareholders of corporation A somehow 
became shareholders of corporation B and no longer shareholders of corporation 
A. The mere statement of such a preposterous proposition did violence to funda­
mental principles. How could a man who owned a horse suddenly find that he 
owned a cow? 
Id. at 245-46 (emphasis added). 
30. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.1, at 343. "The purpose of these stat­
utes is to protect the property rights of dissenting shareholders from actions by majority 
shareholders which alter the character of their investment." Id. at 343; see also Weiss, 
supra note 18, at 629-41. 
Commentators have likened the appraisal remedy to damages in that such statutes are 
designed to recompense the dissenter with what he lost. 2 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 
824, 830 (contemplating a likening to restitutionary damages). See also Jones v. Missouri 
Edison Co., 144 F. 765, 779-80 (6th Cir. 1906). In the author's opinion, such comparisons 
are wasted mental efforts since whether appraisal remedies are or are not like damages is 
irrelevant. In either case the problem is valuing what the shareholder has lost. Moreover, 
drawing analogies from the concept of damages is inapposite to the appraisal setting where 
the courts are not necessarily looking to a party who is at fault, but rather to two parties 
with a difference of opinion. 
31. For other discussion of the problem, see 2 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 826­
36; E. FOLK, supra note 1, at 372-97 (1972); Lattin, supra note 3, at 233; Levy, supra note 
15; Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation ofTheir 
Shares, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 60 (1932); Weiner, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 19; 
Comment, Valuation of Dissenting Stockholders' Shares Under An Appraisal Statute, 23 
Mo. L. REV. 223 (1958); Comment, Corporations-Standard of Valuation of Dissenters' 
Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 51 MICH. L. REV. 713 (1953); Comment, supra note 3; 
Note, Appraisal Statutes-An AnalYSis ofModern Trends, 38 VA. L. REV. 915 (1952); Note, 
Appraisal of Stock Where Certain Stockholders Have Dissented-Basis For Determining 
Value, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 325 (1949); Note, Stock Appraisals: The Dissenting Stock­
holder and the Concept of Value, 16 BROOKLYN L. REV. 86 (1950); Note, Appraisal Rights: 
Compensation to Shareholders Dissenting from Mergers and Consolidations, 40 CAL. L. 
REV. 140 (1952); Note, Judicial Valuation in Corporate Mergers and Consolidations, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 847 (1934); Note, Appraisal ofShares ofDissenting Stockholders in Consoli­
dation-American General Corporation v. Camp, et al., 1 MD. L. REV. 338 (1937); Note, 
Determination of the Value of Dissenting Stockholders' Shares-Chicago Corporation v. 
Munds (Del. 172 Atl. 452), 9 TEMP. L. Q. 239 (1935); Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's 
Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 629 (1977). 
32. ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 10-2A-162 to -163 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.426 
(1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-080 to -081 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-707 
(1980); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1300 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 7-4-123 to -124 (Cum. Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33·373 to ·374 (1985); 
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bia,33 and some United States overseas possessions34 provide dissenter 
and appraisal rights upon the occurrence of certain prescribed 
events.35 
B. Objectives ofAppraisal Statutes: Defining "Value" 
All of the appraisal statutes provide that the dissenter's shares 
must be assessed in terms of "value,"36 yet no statute adequately de-
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.244, .247 (West 1977 & 
Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-250, to -251 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1985); HAWAII 
REV. STAT. §§ 417-19, -25 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-80 to -81 (1980 & 
Cum. Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, ~~ 11.65, .70 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 23-1-5-7, -6-5 (West 1979 & 1985-1986 Supp.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.112 
(West 1949 & Supp. 1985), and § 496A.78 (West 1962 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-6712 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.400, .405 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13-A, §§ 908, 909 (1981); MD. CORP. & AsS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-208, -210 (1985); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 156B, §§ 76, 85-98 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985); MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1761 to .1771 (West 1973 & 1985 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 302A.471, .473 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-159, -161 (1972 & Supp. 1985); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.405, .455 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35­
1-810, -812 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2079 to -2080 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 78.505, .510 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 294.76 to .77 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14A:11-1 to -11 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-15-3 to -4 (1983); 
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 623, 905, 907(c) (McKinney 1984-1986 Supp.); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 55-101(b), -113 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-87 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1701.84 to .85 (page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.157 to .161 (West 
1953 & Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 57.865 to .890 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1515 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985); R.1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-73 to -74 (1985); 
S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 33-19-50, 33-17-90, 33-15-IO(d), 33-11-270 (Law Co. op.1976 & 1985 
Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-6-23 (1983 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 48-1-909 to -915 (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 5.11, 5.12 (Vernon 1980 & 
Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-75 to -76 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 2003, 2004 (1984); VA. CODE § 13-1-75 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN . 
. 	§§ 23A.24.030,.040 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-122 to -123 (1982); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (West Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. §§ 17-1-503 to -504 (1985). 
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-240 (1981). 
34. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 1906 (1976)(Puerto Rico); V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 256 (1982)(U.S. Virgin Islands). 
35. While the statutes may vary considerably in scope and form, nearly all include a 
consolidation or merger as a triggering event. Manning, supra note 3, at 226. Other events 
include change in corporate purposes, change in preference of shares, sale of assets, and 
issuance of stock to employees. Weiner, supra note 17, at 548. 
Some commentators have advocated the repeal of all appraisal statutes arguing that 
appraisal is an anachronism in today's system of sophisticated and reliable markets. Man­
ning, supra note 3, at 232-44; M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 83 
(1976); E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW FOR THE DELAWARE 
CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMMITTEE 196-200 (1965-67) (cited in Kanda & 
Levmore, supra note 10, at 432 n.16 (1985». But see Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in 
Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 875, 881-87 (1983) suggesting that the. 
very longevity and survival of appraisal statutes reflects their legitimacy. 
36. Legislators evidently gave little thought to the seman tical pitfalls created by the 
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fines the term. Given the fact that "value" cannot be defined without 
resort to synonyms37 or lengthy philosophical discourse,38 it is prob­
able that legislators intended the ordinary meaning of the term-"dol­
lar amount or the equivalent"39 or "price".40 While a number of 
academics have studied the meaning of "value" in great detail, some in 
order to assist in judicial valuation techniques,41 it is doubtful that 
legislators addressed their choice of language with such exacting scru­
tiny.42 Therefore, to clarify the objectives of appraisal statutes, it 
would make better sense to concentrate on the modifiers used in con­
nection with the term "value," since the meanings of words find their 
term and left it undefined. To add to the confusion, some legislatures have been so careless 
as to use different terms interchangeably within the same statute. See, e.g., ALA. CIV. 
CODE § 7043 (c. 1925)(cited in Robinson, supra note 31, at 67-68)(using such terms as "ac­
tual value," "full market value," "true market value," and "true value" only sentences 
apart). In construing a similarly garbled tax valuation statute, the New York Court of 
Appeals reasoned that "[t]he value of property is determined by what it could be bought 
and sold for, and there could be no doubt but that these various expressions as used in the 
statutes all are intended to mean the actual value of the property." People ex. rei. Manhat­
tan Ry. Co. v. Barke, 146 N.Y. 304, 312-13,40 N.E. 996, 998 (1895)(emphasis added). 
37. 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 14. 
38. See, e.g., W. URBAN, VALUATION, ITS NATURE AND LAWS (1909); R. PERRY, 
GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE (1926). See also A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Bk. I, 
ch. 4, at 12 (Hutchins ed. 1952) (The Great Books of the Western World, v. 39, 1981)(ref­
erenced in State v. Yates, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 182, 185 (1899». 
39. 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 13-15. "The worth of a thing is the price it will 
bring." Id. at 15. "Value" has been defined, in ordinary usage, as "the monetary worth of 
something." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY 2530 (unabr. ed. 
1976). 
40. Matthews, Valuation ofProperty in the Early Common Law, 35 HARV. L. REV. 
IS, 21 (1921). See also 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 15. 
41. Bonbright, The Problem of Judicial Valuation, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 493 (1927); 
B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE SECURITY ANALYSIS (1962). 
42. Given the wide disparity in wording and substantive provisions in the appraisal 
statutes, some commentators question whether legislatures were guided by any articulable 
objectives at all. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 10, at 433. One explanation for such 
great disparity is that legislatures were attempting to mend an entirely novel problem and 
their legislation was somewhat experimental. Experts writing at the time of much initial 
appraisal rights legislation suggest that legislatures were concerned that allowing for major­
ity rule posed constitutional problems, in that not giving dissenters rights was confiscatory 
and inconsistent with shareholders' contract rights. See BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON 
CORPORATIONS 700 (2d ed. 1946); Levy, supra note IS, at 421 & n.5; Dodd, Dissenting 
Shareholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U.PA. L. REV. 584 (1927). There­
fore, in order to address the constitutional problem, legislatures desired to compensate mi­
nority shareholders and to provide a middle-of-the-road alternative to the extremes of being 
forced to acquiesce to the majority or prevent the change. Levy, supra note IS, at 427. See 
also 12 B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.1 at 342-43. In hastening to correct the 
constitutional problem, legislatures glossed over the mechanical detail necessary for judicial 
implementation. Levy, supra note IS, at 427. One commentator suggests that legislators 
borrowed heavily from the English Companies Act of 1862 and in so doing neglected to 
tailor provisions to local needs. See id. 
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origins in the purposes for which they are used.43 
Examples of expressions used by legislatures include "value,"44 
"fair value,"45 "fair cash value,"46 and "fair market value."47 Appro­
priately, courts have subdivided these phrases into those that contain 
the word "market" and those that do not.48 More importantly, in 
searching for what the correct dollar amount should reflect, courts 
have distinguished between "fair market value" and "market value."49 
Additionally, in states where statutes provide merely the term 
"value," courts have interpreted the statutes to mean "fair value."50 
43. I BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 10-14; Bonbright, supra note 41, at 518. 
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-080 to -81 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-5-7,­
6-5 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985-86); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712 91981); MICH. COMPo 
LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1761 to .1771 (West 1873 & Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 78-505, .510 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 56-IOI(b), -1113 91982); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 
14, § 1906 (1976); V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 256 (1982). 
45. ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 1O-2A-162 to -163 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-707 
(1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-4-123 to 124 (Cum. Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29­
240 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 606.244, .247 (West 1977 & 1985 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 14-2-250 to -251 (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-80 to -81 (1980 & 
Cum. Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 32, ~~ 11.65, .70 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 491.112 (West 1949 & Supp. 1985), and § 496A.78 (West 1962 & Supp. 1985); Ky. 
REV. STAT. ANN §§ 271A .400, .405 (Bobbs-Merrill 1984 Cum. Supp.); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. I3-A, §§ 908, 909 (1981); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-208, -210 
(1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A. 471, 473 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-159, 
-161 (1972 & Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.405, .455 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1986); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-810, -812 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2079 to 2080(1983); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-15-3 to -4 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 623, 905, 907(c) 
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.157 to .161 (West 1953 & 
Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 57.865 to .890 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1515 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985); R.1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1 -73 to -74 (1985); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 33-19-50, 33-17-90, 33-15-IO(d), 33-11-270 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 
1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-909 to -915 (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 
5.11,5.12 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-75 to -76 (1973); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. II, §§ 2003, 2004 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-7591978; WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN §§ 23A.24.030,.040 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1­
122 to -123 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (West Supp. 1985). 
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986) (statute also uses 
interchangeably the terms "value" and "fair value"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.510 (1986); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Page 1985). 
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-374 (West 1960)(also uses the term "value"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417-25 (1976 & 
West 1984). 
48. Lattin, supra note 3, at 258-60; Weiner, supra note 17, at 560-62; Robinson, supra 
note 31, at 66-77. 
49. 2 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 828, 834-35; Comment, Valuation ofDissenting 
Stockholders'Shares Under an Appraisal Statute, 23 Mo. L. REV. 223, 231 (1958). One 
court stated that under some circumstances, "the market quotations should be considered 
but not accepted as decisive of a fair market price." In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 493, 178 
N.E. 766, 768 (1931). 
50. See Lattin, supra note 23, at 259-60; Robinson, supra note 31, at 67-68. 
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The practice of reading fairness into the valuation process, whether 
the statute provides for "fair value" or not, suggests that a "fair value" 
is different from a "value." In noting such a distinction, legislatures 
and courts point to a purpose in providing for fair value, namely, to 
avoid figures derived from forced sales. 51 Instead, legislatures and 
courts contemplate the mythical willing buyer and willing seller arriv­
ing at a mutually acceptable price, neither having been compelled to 
transact. 52 Courts have referred to the above conceptualization as a 
share's "intrinsic" value. 53 Since the dissenters' ouster can be likened 
easily to a forced sale in the absence of an appraisal remedy, the intrin­
sic value concept is important in that the amount the majority offers 
the dissenters may not be fair. 54 
Thus, one objective of all appraisal statutes is to require the cor­
poration to pay the dissenter the cash amount on which a willing 
buyer and willing seller, neither being compelled to transact, would 
agree for the exchange of an interest in a going concern55 equivalent to 
that surrendered by the dissenter. 56 
C. Origins of the Delaware Block Approach 
Since the right to appraisal is purely a statutory remedy, 57 the 
history of valuing businesses (and stock therein) in dissenter situations 
necessarily begins with such statutes. 58 Yet, the appraisal statutes 
failed to provide for any specific valuation procedure. Consequently, 
courts, in valuing dissenters' shares, looked to existing stock valuation 
techniques in order to fulfill legislative objectives. Judicial valuation 
51. See In re Dupignac's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 27, 204 N.Y.S. 273, 276 (1924). 
52. In re Tudor City Fifth Unit, Inc., 17 A.D.2d 794, 794,232 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 
(1962). Cf Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-1, 20-2031-1(b) (1984). 
53. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 
1950). 
54. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
55. The "going concern" here is the corporation be/ore the change to which the dis­
senter objected. 
56. Still greater definition is available. For instance, the interest with which the will­
ing buyer and willing seller will be concerned will always be a minority interest, since only 
the dissent of a minority will invoke the remedy of the appraisal statute. This arrangement 
means that the 'control' value of the minority's shares will usually not be significant, which 
in tum allows for the possibility that a fair value for the dissenter's shares will be lower 
than the amount offered by the majority. But see Kanda & Levmore, supra note 10, at 433 
(authors suggest that "appraisal may have been underestimated or misunderstood because 
drafters and courts sitting in review never have linked appraisal to any particular goal of 
corporate law"). 
57. Manning, supra note 3, at 226. 
58. See supra notes 29-30. 
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of shares was common in such areas as tax assessment, S9 cases involv­
ing a corporation's conversion of a minority holder's shares,6o and 
cases of contested sales of assets.61 
Judicial definition of ambiguous appraisal statute terms came 
slowly.62 In earlier cases, some courts concluded that some form of 
asset value (sales/market or replacement less depreciation and obsoles­
cence) and capitalized earnings were the best indicators of value.63 
Other courts looked primarily to exchange quotations or market value 
of a company's shares, if established and reliable figures were avail­
able.64 Still, most courts determined that no one formula existed ex­
59. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, ISS Mass. 313,29 N.E. 
532 (1892). 
60. See, e.g., International & Great N. R. R. Co. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (1880). 
61. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 64, 122 A. 
142 (1923). In some instances, courts actually borrowed procedures from analogous situa­
tions. For example, in In re Seaich, the court likened an appraisal proceeding to a practical 
distribution and determined value, as it would have in a dissolution case, through asset 
valuation. 170 A.D. 686,156 N.Y.S. 579 (1st Dept. 1915), ajJ'd 219 N.Y. 634,114 N.E. 
1083 (1916). Accord People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892); Murrin v. Archi­
bald Consol. Coal Co., 232 N.Y. 541, 134 N.E. 563 (1921). Justice Holmes of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts assailed valuation approaches in appraisal proceedings 
that approximated methods used in liquidations or dissolutions: 
Actual values are based upon existing states of fact, not upon hypotheses; and the 
actual value of shares in a going concern depends not only upon its property, but 
also upon its prospects. 
National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, ISS Mass. 313, 315, 29 N.E. 532, 533 (1892). 
Courts have looked to other types of valuation procedures for guidance in an appraisal 
procedure. At one time, an Illinois statute provided that the fair value of a dissenter's 
shares shall be appraised "so far as practicable under the eminent domain laws." ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 32, § 32(1) (Cahill 1929)(cited in Robinson, supra note 31, at 66 n.21). 
62. Lattin, supra note 3, at 260, 270; Levy, supra note IS, at 436; Robinson, supra 
note 31, at 70. 
63. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. y. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 64, 68-69, 122 A. 
142, 146 (1923); International & Great N. R. R., Co. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96, 120-21 
(1880). 
64. See, e.g., Matter of Morris Canal & Banking Co., 104 N.J. 526, 141 A. 784 
(1928); Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 936, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 359-60 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ajJ'd 
mem., 270 A.D. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1946)("market value, where it fairly reflects the 
opinion of informed buyers and sellers, is the best evidence of value for all purposes."); In 
re Marcus, 273 A.D. 725, 727, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (1st Dept. 1948), appeal dismissed, 277 
A.D. 963, 99 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1st Dept. 1950), ajJ'd, 303 N.Y. 711, 103 N.E.2d 338 (1951). 
Market value is the controlling, if not conclusive, consideration where there is a free and 
open market and the volume of transactions and conditions make the market a fair reflec­
tion of the judgment of the buying and selling public. In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 
(Sup. Ct.), ajJ'd, 271 A.D. 1007,69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dept. 1946). The approach taken in 
the above cases was influenced by the way in which courts have traditionally handled tax 
assessment cases such as Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 113 N.E. 189 (1916). Robinson, 
supra note 31, at 69-73. 
Many courts, however, loathed the use of market value as a primary indicator of value. 
One court remarked, "no more than a moment's reflection is needed to refute it. There are 
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elusively for valuing dissenters' shares.65 Of paramount importance, 
however, is that at some point most courts began to agree that no one 
factor should be decisive, but rather that a number of factors or meth­
ods of valuation should be considered together,66 perhaps even 
averaged.67 
III. THE DELAWARE BLOCK ApPROACH To VALUATION 
The landmark decision of Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye 68 set 
forth the procedure for determining the dissenter's aliquot share of a 
business under the Delaware block approach: 
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the 
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from 
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern. By value of 
the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise 
is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been 
taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents this 
true intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take into con­
sideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter 
into the fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, 
earnings prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts 
which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of 
merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the 
merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the 
value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be consid­
ered by the agency fixing the value. 69 
too many accidental circumstances entering into the making of market prices to admit 
them as sure and exclusive reflectors of 'fair value.''' Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 
142, 150-52, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934). See also American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896 
(6th Cir. 1923); American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937); Roes­
sler v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 147 Ohio St. 480, 72 N.E.2d 259 (1947). 
65. See, e.g., Matter of Marcus, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 
1948)(while a presumption exists that market value is correct, shareholders may attempt to 
refute it using a number of other methods); In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct.), 
affd, 271 A.D. 1007,69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1st Dept. 1946)(even if reliable, market alone can­
not be used as basis of appraisal valuation). 
66. In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 497-99, 52 A.2d 6, 15 
(1947); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 526,74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 
67. Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 224 A.2d 260, 264-65 (Del. 1966); In re Dela­
ware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 415-25, 213 A.2d 203, 209-14 (Del. 1965); In re 
Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. Ch. 1968). 
68. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950). 
69. Id. at 526, 74 A.2d at 72. By intrinsic value, the court means more than mere 
liquidation value. Intrinsic value incorporates both the value of a corporation's assets and 
the value of its future earning capacity. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., long ago alluded to 
the essence of intrinsic value in National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, ISS Mass. 
313,315-16,29 N.E. 532, 533 (1892). See supra note 60. 
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Ordinarily, the appraiser will isolate the factors relevant to each 
of three different methods of valuing70 enterprises: (A) net asset 
value, (B) capitalized earnings, and (C) market value.71 After arriving 
at a dollar amount for each measure, the appraiser will assign a weight 
to each measure's resulting figure. 72 As there is no rule of thumb as to 
the actual numbers to be assigned, the particular weight given each 
measure is determined by the facts of each case.73 The appraiser mul­
tiplies each factor by its respective weight, and the resulting figures 
are then added together to obtain the value of the enterprise (or the 
dissenters' shares)J4 The court will weight the factors, it is said, to 
ensure that no single factor will be controlling and that the effect of 
defects in anyone will be minimized.75 
70. While courts long ago realized that a number of factors are important to the 
willing buyer and willing seller in detennining value, Tri-Continental Corp., 31 Del. Ch. at 
526, 74 A.2d at 72, they also recognized the distinction between a factor affecting value and 
a means of measuring value. See. e.g., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 
Del. Ch. 64, 68-69, 122 A. 142, 146 (1923). Still, the three most popular methods ofvalua­
tion are often referred to as factors. FOLK, supra note 1, at 380. 
71. See. e.g., Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276,280, 194 A.2d SO, 53 
(1953); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 
(1950). See also FOLK, supra note 1, at 380; Note, supra note 19, at 1456-57; Note, The 
Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 629,633 (1977). 
72. FOLK, supra note 1, at 380. 
73. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Co., 413 A.2d 137, 143 (Del. 1980); In re Delaware Racing 
Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 425, 213 A.2d 203, 214 (Del. 1965); In re Olivetti Underwood 
Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 804 (DeI.Ch. 1968). 
74. FOLK, supra note 1, at 380. For example, suppose the appraiser makes the fol­
lowing detennination with respect to a hypothetical business: asset value of the company 
equals $3.5 million; earnings value equals $3 million; and market value (number of out­
standing shares times the per share market price) equals $3.2 million. Suppose further that 
the appraiser assigns weights as follows: 60 percent to earnings; 20 percent to asset value; 
and 20 percent to market value. Thus: 
Asset value $3,500,000 X 20%=$ 700,000 
Earnings value 3,000,000 X 60%= 1,800,000 
Market value 3,200,000 X 20% = 640,000 
Total value $3,140,000 
Where t is the number of shares outstanding and n is the number of shares held by dissenter 
Y, Y is entitled to payment of the product of the following equation: 
$3,140,000 
X n 
75. See Note, supra note 19, at 1468; Note, supra note 71, at 640. See. e.g., Francis I. 
duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344,352 (Del. Ch. 1973); Endicott 
Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 588-89, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106-08,338 N.E.2d 614, 
616 (1975); Santee Oil Co., Inc. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 274, 217 S.E.2d 789,792 (1975). 
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A. Asset Value 76 
Central to valuing an operational entity's assets77 is the need to 
value them on a going-concern basis, which is to say that a group of 
assets is presumed to have a greater value as part of a cohesive, inte­
grated whole than they would were they sold as separate, individual 
units. 78 Nevertheless, some courts continue to value assets individu­
ally.79 Problems arise when no market exists for particular assets. Or­
dinarily, in such instances, a court will compute the present cost of 
replacing the asset, discounting for such matters as depreciation and 
obsolescence.80 
B. Earnings Value 8l 
The capitalized earnings approach represents a method by which 
the future income of the enterprise is estimated on the basis of past 
earnings. 82 The procedure involves two steps: averaging past earn­
ings83 and capitalizing the resulting average by a multiplier.84 As a 
rule, earnings for the five years immediately preceding the precipitat­
76. For a more complete discussion of asset valuation, see Note, supra note 19, at 
1457-60; Note, supra note 71, at 634-37; 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 5906.14. 
77. Goodwill and other intangible assets are ordinarily included in asset valuation. 
Alhenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. ISS, 192 N.E. 824 (1934); In re Seaich, 170 
A.D. 686, 156 N.Y.S. 579 (1915), ajJ'd, 219 N.Y. 634, 114 N.E. 1083 (1916). 
78. See supra note 4. E.g., Tri-Continental Corp., 31 Del. Ch. at 530, 74 A.2d at 74; 
Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 568-69, 123 A.2d 121, 126 (1956). 
79. FOLK, supra note I, at 381. "By 'fair market value', the Delaware courts mean 
the price that would be agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer under usual and 
ordinary circumstances, after consideration of all available uses and purposes of the assets 
in question ..." Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard ofFairness ofMerger Terms Under 
Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44,56 (1977). See also Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 
243 A.2d 67, 70 (Del. 1968). 
80. See In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 416-17, 213 A.2d 203, 209-11 
(1965); Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 472-73 (DeI.Ch. 1975); Felder 
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 86, 159 A.2d 278, 284 (1960). 
81. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 5906.15; Comment, supra note 3, at 780­
81. For a more complete discussion of earnings valuation, see Note, supra note 19, at 1464­
68; Note, supra note 71, at 637-39; . 
82. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 146-47 (Del. 1980); Note, supra note 
19, at 1464. 
83. Delaware case law requires that earnings value be determined through the use of 
historical earnings rather than prospective earnings. Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. 
Ch. 169, 128 A.2d 225 (1957). 
84. FOLK, supra note I, at 383-84; Comment, supra note 3, at 780; Note, supra note 
70, at 637. The multiplier is essentially a risk indicator. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218-19 (Del. 1975). For various multiplier consid­
erations, see id. at 219-21; Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 470-74 (Del. 
Ch. 1975); and Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 430 (1970). 
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ing event are used to derive an average earnings figure. 85 The recipro­
cal of the multiplier should be roughly equal to the rate of return a 
prudent investor would demand in making an investment in a particu­
lar business to yield a particular return. 86 
C. Market Value 87 
The Delaware block approach also places significant weight on a 
share's market value if the figure is reliable.88 However, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery long ago established the doctrine that market value 
alone should not contro1.89 Once determined,90 market figures will 
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 
1975). See also In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406,421, 213 A.2d 203, 212 
(Del. 1965); In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 A.2d 800, 804 (DeI.Ch. 1968). 
Courts prefer to average earnings over several years in order to balance extraordinary 
profits and losses. Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., Inc. 39 Del. Ch. 61, 67, 158 A.2d 797, 
800 (1960)(two years is insufficient); 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORA­
TIONS 376 (5th ed. 1953). However, too many years has been held to be distortive, since 
more recent figures are thought to be more accurate indicators of future earnings. Wood­
ward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1093-94, 133 N.W.2d 38, 47, modified on rehearing, 257 
Iowa 1104, 136 N.W.2d 280 (1965)(ten years is distortive). 
The author suggests that courts use a weighted average whereby the credibility of 
more recent years as future indicators is emphasized at the expense of the less indicative 
older figures, which are weighted less. Such an approach would tend to increase the predic­
tive value of the resulting figure. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 941 
(Del. 1985)(approving of weighted average). 
86. See, e.g., R. HAMILTON, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 1-7 
(1984). Often, courts will use a price-to-earnings ratio as the multiplier. Comment, supra 
note 3, at 780 & n.39. See, e.g., Santee Oil Co., Inc. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 276, 217 S.E.2d 
789,793 (1975). Less frequently, courts resort to the capitalization ratios suggested in 1 A. 
DEWING, supra note 85, at 390-91. FOLK, supra note 1, at 384; Note, supra note 19, at 
1467. See, e.g., Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 87, 159 A.2d 278, 284­
5 (1960). 
Establishing the multiplier is the most contentious phase of the Delaware block ap­
proach largely because of the lack of objectivity in the process by which it is derived. Gib­
bons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 471 (DeI.Ch. 1975)(the multiplier is 
invariably "difficult and imprecise"). See also Note, supra note 19, at 1467; Comment, 
supra note 3, at 780. 
87. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at § 5906.13; Comment, supra note 3, at 781. 
For a more complete discussion of market value issues, see Note, supra note 19, 1460-64; 
Note, supra note 71, at 639-40. 
88. FOLK, supra note 1, at 385-86. 
89. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150-52, 172 A. 452, 455-56 (1934). 
See also Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 140-42, 163 N.E.2d 9, 12-13 
(1959); Comment, supra note 48, at 230. The Munds decision was issued during the Great 
Depression and must be considered in that context. At the time, valuation at market would 
have resulted in a windfall to the majority shareholders who prompted the claimant's dis­
sent. Banks, Measuring the Value a/Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. L. REV. 1,28-29 (1974). 
For other decisions similar to that of Munds. see Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline 
Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (1950); Alhenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, Inc., 358 Ill. 
155, 192 N.E. 824 (1934); Republic Finance & Investment Co. v. Fenstermaker, 211 Ind. 
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then be adjusted to eliminate extraordinary matters of influence on 
market value.91 Where market values are either not available or unre­
liable, the court will ascribe little or no weight to the value.92 A cor­
poration's history of paying dividends mayor may not be reflected in 
the market value.93 For instance, where one company demonstrated a 
history of not paying dividends, the court weighted the zero dividends 
value independently.94 
D. Recent Appraisal of the Delaware Block 
Recently, dissenting shareholders have questioned the reliability 
and the validity of the Delaware block approach in court.95 All juris­
251,6 N.E.2d 541 (1937); American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 
(1937); Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504,113 N.E. 189 (1916); Perkins v. Public Service Co., 
93 N.H. 459, 45 A.2d 210 (1946); Austin v. City Stores, 89 Pa. D. & C. 57 (C.P. 1953); 
Adams v. United States Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134,34 S.E.2d 244 (1945), In re Ames, 
affd sub nom Ames v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 229 A.D. 858, 243 N.Y.S. 798 (1930), affd, 
256 N.Y. 676, !77 N.E. 189 (1931)(cited in Robinson, supra note 31 at 72)(unreported 
N.Y. Sup. Cc decision). 
90. In Delaware, a court will refer to actual exchange or listing quotations. In their 
absence, however, the court will "reconstruct" a market value. In re Delaware Racing 
Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 419, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1976). Reconstructing a market 
figure is done by "discounting the net asset value [which is a figure representing the total 
value of a company's assets less prior claims] of the common stock on the day of merger." 
Tri-Continental Corp., 31 Del. Ch. at 530, 74 A.2d at 74. See e.g., Estate of Newcomer v. 
United States, 447 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978)(estate tax case). 
91. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 31-34 (DeI.Ch. 
1971)(adjusted for inflationary effect of competing tender offers); David J. Greene & Co. v. 
Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (DeI.Ch. 1968)(adjustment for insignificance of 
market quotation in light of parent company's controlling block). 
92. Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 
1973); Felder v Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960); Sporborg 
v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del.Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (Ch. 1960); Foglesong v. Thur­
ston National Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606 (Okla. 1976); Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 
42 Del.Ch. 477, 215 A.2d 242 (1965). 
93. Delaware courts have recognized that a company's dividend payment record 
bears significantly on the business's value. However, one court stated that "dividends are 
so closely related to earnings that they largely reflect the same value factor," and proceeded 
to eliminate dividends as an independent consideration. Felder v. Anderson Clayton & 
Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 88-9, 159 A.2d 278,285 (1960). See Note, supra note 71, at 641-42 and 
Note, supra note 19 at 1469 for an abstract of a number of Delaware opinions and their 
treatment of dividends as a factor in valuation. 
94. See, e.g., Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 598-99, 98 A.2d 774, 
777-78 (Del. 1953); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 423, 213 A.2d 203,213 
(Del. 1965)(the court averaged in a fourth and separate dividend value of zero to reflect the 
corporation's past failure to pay dividends). But see In re Olivetti Underwood Corp., 246 
A.2d 800, 804 (Del. Ch. 1968)(Corporation's failure to pay dividends on absence of divi­
dends not given independendent consideration by the court). 
95. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983); Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 224, 
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dictions confronting the matter have followed the landmark decision 
of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc..96 In Weinberger the court held, among 
other things, that to the extent the Delaware block approach "ex­
cludes other generally accepted techniques used in the financial com­
munity and the courts, it is now clearly outmoded."97 The recent 
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co. 98 decision, however, left no doubt that the 
Delaware block approach is still an acceptable means of valuing stock 
in dissenter/appraisal situations.99 Interestingly, courts have adopted 
the Delaware block method since the Weinberger decision, noting that 
Weinberger did not reject the block approach to valuation. loo 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE DELAWARE BLOCK ApPROACH 
Courts in Delaware have used the Delaware block approach for 
the past forty years, especially during the 1960's and 1970's. 101 A 
number of courts throughout the country have adopted the Delaware 
block approach 102 largely because it is conceptually rather simple and 
relatively easy to administer. 103 Nonetheless, the method has become 
479 N.E.2d 173, 178-79 (1985); Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 
668 & n.l (Tenn. 1983). 
96. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
97. Id. at 712. Recent cases and commentary have erroneously interpreted the lan­
guage in Weinberger as the Delaware Supreme Court's rejection of the Delaware block 
approach. See, e.g., Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, No. 121012, at 3 
(April 24, 1985) (Mass. Super. Ct. decision, Norfolk, Young, J.); R. HAMILTON, supra note 
86, at 44. 
98. 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). 
99. Id. at 940. Accord Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 224, 479 N.E.2d 173, 
178-79 (1985); Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659,668 & n.l (Tenn. 
1983). 
100. See Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 668 & n.l (Tenn. 
1983). 
101. Schaefer, supra note 11, at 1033; Comment, supra note 3, at 779. 
102. See Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38 (1965); Moore v. 
New Ammest, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 461,630 P.2d 167 (1981); Ford v. Courier-Journal Job 
Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); In re Valuation of Common Stock of 
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979); Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 
377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979); Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway 
Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1968); Tome Land & Improvement Co. v. Silva, 83 N.M. 549, 
494 P.2d 962 (1972); Klurfield v. Equity Enterprises, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 124, 136-37, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 303, 311 (1981); In re Tudor City Fifth Unit, Inc., 17 A.D.2d 794,232 N.Y.S.2d 
758 (1962); Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249 (N.D. 1971); Foglesong v. 
Thurston Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 606 (Okla. 1976); Santee Oil Co., Inc. v. Cox, 265 
S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975); Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 
665-67,668 n.l (Tenn. 1983); Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147 
(1964). See also Conard, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissent­
ers'Rights: A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1874 
(1977). 
103. Comment, supra note 3, at 779. 
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the object of considerable criticism as to both its reliability and its 
validity. 104 
A. Recent Criticisms of the Delaware Block 
One argument posed by commentators and courts alike is that the 
Delaware block approach, as used by most courts today, is a corrup­
tion of the method originally devised in Delaware courts. lOS Accord­
ing to this argument, the Delaware block focuses on only three values 
and ignores many additional relevant factors.106 The argument is fal­
lacious, however, for as a number of courts have observed in the past, 
one need not weight each and every factor independently in order to 
consider it. Rather, many factors are considered at each stage in the 
Delaware block approach, such as when weighting the values lO7 or 
104. See generally Schaefer, supra note 10 (the Delaware block approach always un­
dervalues shares); Comment, supra note 3, (fails to consider all factors relevant to valua­
tion). This note draws on methodology widely used in survey research. Thus, the author 
must advert to a critical conceptual distinction between reliability and validity. A tech­
nique of measurement is reliable when it yields the same measure each time it is applied to 
the same object. BABBI, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 113-14 (3d ed. 1983). Pro­
fessor Babbi provides the following illustrative example: 
Suppose, for example, that I asked you to estimate how much I weigh. You look 
me over carefully and guess that I weigh 165 pounds.... Now let's suppose I 
ask you to estimate the weights of 30 to 40 other people, and while you're en­
grossed in that, I slip back into line wearing a clever disguise. When my turn 
comes again, you guess 180 pounds .... That little exercise would have demon­
strated that having you estimate people's weights was not a very reliable tech­
nique. 
Suppose, however, that I had loaned you my bathroom scale to use in weigh­
ing people. No matter how clever my disguise, you would presumably announce 
the same weight for me both times, indicating that the scale provided a more 
reliable measure of weight than guessing. 
Id. at 114. 
It is important to note, however, that reliability does not guarantee accuracy. One 
could recalibrate the "empty" weight of the scale to five pounds, and while the scale would 
be no less reliable, it would yield inaccurate measures. Id. Validity, on the other hand, has 
to do with a technique's capacity to measure what it purports to measure. Id. at 117-18. 
For instance, Professor Babbi's scale would be a valid measure of one's weight but would be 
invalid as a means of, say, measuring one's height. 
105. Comment, supra note 3, at 782; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13. 
106. Comment, supra note 3, at 779, 782; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. See, e.g., In 
re Delaware Racing Ass'n., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965); Felder v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, 
Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956); Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 
194 A.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 
368, 75 A.2d 244 (1950); Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 
N.E.2d 1145 (1979). 
107. See Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 145 (Del. 1980); Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975); Gibbons v. Schen­
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choosing a multiplier: 108 
The three standards that have received almost universal recognition 
in appraising the intrinsic value of stock under statutes of this type 
are (1) market value, (2) net asset value, and (3) investment (or 
earnings) value .... 'All relevant factors' ... can be considered 
under one or more of these three standards. 109 
A further assault against the citadel of the Delaware block depicts 
the approach as an inflexible, formulaic I 10 approach to valuation in an 
area where no one method of valuation should control. lll "The ascer­
tainment of value. . . is not a matter of formulae, but there must be a 
reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all 
relevant facts."112 Courts outside Delaware tend to see the approach 
taken in Delaware as an attempt to denominate a fixed set of factors as 
indicative of value. l13 Yet courts that employ the Delaware block 
contend that "[i]t is unwise to attempt to state every factor that may 
bear on the value of stock."114 In fact, the Delaware courts have not 
attempted to list every decisive valuation factor. Quite some time ago, 
the Delaware Supreme Court maintained that "the appraiser and 
courts must [consider] all factors and elements which reasonably might 
enter into the fixing ofvalue." I 15 As articulated above, just because an 
appraiser does not "block off' and value separately a particular factor 
should not suggest that the appraiser never considered it in the valua­
ley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 472-73 (Del. Ch. 1975); Root v. York Co., 29 Del. Ch. 
351, 364, 50 A.2d 52, 58 (1946). 
108. See, e.g., Uniyersal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 
218-21 (Del. 1975); Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 470-71 (Del. Ch. 
1975); Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 565-67, 123 A.2d 121, 125 
(1956). See also FOLK, supra note 1, at 387. 
109. Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 1081-82, 133 N.W.2d 38, 40 (1965). 
110. It is quite correct to think of a formula as an equation composed of a fixed 
integration of variables and mathematical functions. Such a formula or equation is useful 
only to the extent that the values plugged into the variable positions within the equation are 
precise. A formula loses its utility when the variables plugged into it are not reflective of 
the values they are meant to represent. See e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 894 (unabridged ed. 1976)(definition of "formula"). 
Ill. Roessler v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 147 Ohio St. 480, 484-85, 72 N.E.2d 
259, 261 (1947). 
112. Standard Oil Co. v. So. Pacific Co., 268 U.S. 146, 156 (1925). 
113. Id.; Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Amfac, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 116, 127 & 
nn.31-33 (D. Hawaii 1974). 
114. Robbins v. Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 91, 67 N.W.2d 12, 18 (1954). 
115. Tri-Continental Corp., 31 Del. Ch. at 526, 74 A.2d at 72 (emphasis added); 
accord Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 
1975); In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406,415,213 A.2d 203, 209 (Del. 1975). 
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tion process. 116 The Delaware courts have long been aware that their 
valuation methodology is inherently subjective and have never consid­
ered the Delaware block approach to be excessively formulaic. I 17 
B. Unreliability and Subjectivity of the Delaware Block Approach 
What then is wrong with the Delaware block approach? It sutTers 
from two critical shortcomings. First, the approach is unnecessarily 
random and subjective in that it averages together three very ditTerent 
methods, each possessing its own inaccuracies. To the extent that 
each major valuation component of the block approach is inaccurate, 
so is the final computation yielded by the Delaware block approach. 
Second, and much the result of the first, the Delaware block approach 
often undervalues a dissenter's shares. It often undervalues because it 
almost always I IS averages a liquidation value together with other val­
ues reflective of the business as a going concern. Such an overempha­
sis on liquidation acts as an anchor, ensuring that the Delaware block 
approach will always yield conservative estimates of value. Moreover, 
while choosing the higher of either asset or earnings value may be a 
more acceptable alternative to the Delaware block approach, such a 
method has its own significant shortcomings. 
The first criticism of the Delaware block approach stems from the 
process of mathematically averaging three very ditTerent measures of 
corporate worth. As each of the three values derived in the approach 
is often suspect, averaging them together only compounds their pre­
dictive unreliability. Most significantly, the approach's requirement of 
mathematically weighting values infuses an additional and unneces­
sary element of SUbjectivity into the valuation process. 119 
Historically, courts did not contemplate the use of weighted aver­
ages in appraisal cases. 120 Rather, each court ordinarily mentioned 
that a number of factors were to be considered. l2l Significantly, ear­
lier courts realized the independence of each of the factors mentioned, 
116. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 470-74 (Del. Ch. 
1975) (various factors considered in choosing a multiplier). 
117. Id. at 471 (valuation is inherently subjective and almost always difficult and 
imprecise). 
118. See Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975) (asset 
value given weight of zero since assets were idle and obsolete). 
119. In re Delaware Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 425, 213 A.2d 203, 214 (Del. 
1975) ("The question of what weight to give the various elements of value lies always 
within the realm of judgment.") 
120. See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); In re Fulton, 
257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). 
121. See, e.g., Root v. York Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 351, 359-60, 50 A.2d 52, 56 (1946). 
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and it is unlikely that any court contemplated the mathematically inte­
grated methodology of the Delaware block. Courts realized, for in­
stance, that an assets valuation approach was an entirely different 
means of obtaining a value than a capitalized earnings approach.122 
As one court observed, while market prices, net asset value, and net 
earnings should all be considered in valuing property, this is not to say 
that they must all be averaged to come up with yet a different 
number. 123 Instead, the court can choose to base its final assessment 
of value on figures derived from one, some, or all of the factors consid­
ered. 124 In short, the earlier cases indicate that a judge or an appraiser 
should consider the various factors individually as opposed to plug­
ging them into a mathematical equation. 125 
Serious problems with the Delaware block approach lie in the re­
liability of its three constituent parts, namely, the validity and accu­
racy of the asset, earnings, and market valuation methods. 
1. Asset Valuation 
Significantly, the Delaware block methodology mandates that the 
value of a company's assets impact upon the company's overall 
value. 126 As Delaware courts have noted, the asset value to be mea­
sured by the courts and appraisers is "theoretical[ly a] liquidating 
value to which the share would be entitled upon the company going 
out of business." 127 Yet virtually all courts, including those in Dela­
ware, agree that appraisal valuations should value a business as a go­
122. See, e.g., Allied Chern & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. 
Ch. 64,68-69, 122 A. 142, 146 (1923); Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249, 
254-258 (N.D. 1971) (recognizing that market, asset, and earnings values represent the end 
products of three different valuation methods). 
123. Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 220 Md. 478,487, 154 A.2d 796, 801 (1959). 
"Having considered the relevant factors bearing on fair value, they [the appraisers] were 
not obliged to average them; rather, they could give such weight to one or more as they 
determined the facts indicated." Id. Passages of the Warren opinion immediately preced­
ing the above quote clearly indicate that the judge has used the term "weight" subjectively 
and did not contemplate mathematical weighted averages, the approach employed in Dela­
ware. Id. See also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 308, 93 A.2d 107, 
115 (Del. 1952). 
124. Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 220 Md. 478,487, 154 A.2d 796, 801 (1959). 
125. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); Allied 
Chern. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 64, 68-69,122 A. 142, 146 
(1923); In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931). For more recent cases, see, e.g., 
Southdown, Inc. v. McGinnis, 89 Nev. 184, 510 P.2d 636 (1973) (no weight required as 
long as all relevant factors are considered). 
126. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text. 
127. Tri-Continental Corp., 31 Del. Ch. at 530, 74 A.2d at 74. Net asset value is "a 
value based on a hypothetical dissolution and distribution of the corporate assets." 12 B W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.14, at 397. Accord Republic Finance & Investment Co. 
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ing concern. 128 A stockholder does not purchase shares in a 
corporation in anticipation of participating in a liquidation of corpo· 
rate assets. Rather, he invests in the future prospects of a going con· 
cern. 129 A liquidation value represents the very antithesis of 
recognition of a business as a going concern. Therefore, in the event 
the going concern value exceeds an enterprise's liquidation value, the 
Delaware block will consistently undervalue dissenters' shares. 130 
The argument used to justify the consideration of asset value with 
respect to any business is that liquidation is an actual possibility. An 
investment at some point in the future may well end in liquidation of 
the firm's assets.l3l Thus, before the appraiser could weight each 
value, he must consider the dissenting shareholder's objectives. 132 
Delaware case history, however, does not support such an argument. 
In most Delaware appraisal cases, the court gave significant weight to 
asset value. 133 While a few corporations in such cases included land 
holding companies and one company was actually in liquidation, 134 
the bulk of the businesses valued were going manufacturing or service 
businesses. 135 Such businesses should not have been accorded such a 
high probability of liquidation in the valuation process. In fact, the 
case history indicates that the weight courts has assigned to asset value 
have varied more as a result of the value's reliability than its predic. 
tive worth as to the probability of a liquidation. 136 
v. Fenstermaker, 211 Ind. 251, 6 N.E.2d 541 (1937)(going value should be considered in 
addition to liquidation value). 
128. Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 598, 98 A.2d 774, 777 (1953); 
Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 220 Md. 478, 483, 154 A.2d 796, 799 (1959). 
In determining this value, the fact that the property, if the mortgages had 
been foreclosed, would have left nothing for stockholders, is not the true test, 
much less is it controlling; but it is the fair market value of the property, in its 
then condition as an established and going business. 
American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896, 902 (6th Cir. 1923). See also Note, supra note 
71, at 634, and supra notes 80-85. 
129. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150, 172 A. 452, 455 (1934). 
130. See FOLK, supra note I, at 381; Schaefer, supra note 11, at 1040. 
131. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 473 (Del. Ch. 
1975). 
[T]he weight assigned to market value might correspond to the probability 
that the shareholder would have sold her stock; the weight for earnings value to 
the probability that she would have retained her shares for a considerable period 
of time; and the weight for asset value to the probability of corporate liquidation. 
Schaefer, supra note II, at 1073. 
132. Note, supra note 19, at 1468. 
133. See Note, supra note 71, at 641-42. 
134. Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 473 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
135. See Note, supra note 71, at 641-42. 
136. See, e.g., Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774 (1953) 
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One critic suggests that an appraiser should determine value as 
the higher of either the asset or the earnings figures. \37 By not doing 
so, it is claimed that the Delaware block approach necessarily under­
values the shares of an enterprise. 138 But such an argument ignores 
the fact that asset valuation should be restricted to liquidation and 
dissolution, as the proper measure of value in dissenters' actions is that 
of a going concern. 139 While it is true that weighting various valuation 
techniques often undervalues corporate shares, it does not follow that 
an appraiser must rely solely on asset value. Again, such an approach 
requires the appraiser to second guess shareholder objectives. Conse­
quently, the asset value of a business is typically of little use in valuing 
a going business in a dissenter's appraisal proceeding. l40 
2. Market Value 
Market valuation is virtually worthless in situations where either 
no market exists or only thin or irregular trading is evidenced. 141 
Even when established market quotations exist, the market valuation 
technique is problematic. 142 
In criticizing the many terms that jurisdictions use to avoid a 
market valuation, such as "fair value," "fair cash value," and "intrin­
sic value," a California court reasoned that market value is the most 
reliable means of valuation: 143 
We do not know what those terms or others like them mean, and we 
suspect that the writers who advocate them do not know either. 
They use them because they distrust the market as a gauge of value. 
Yet realistically, under our economic system, the value of any item 
(asset value discounted on grounds of unreliability); Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 
Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960) (asset value discounted on grounds of unreliability). 
137. Schaefer, supra note 11, at 1038-39. Professor Schaefer argues that since a 
weighted average of asset and earnings values will always result in an appraisal value some­
where between the two, "[t]he value of the corporation should be equal to the higher of the 
two values, since the higher value represents the more profitable use of the corporation's 
resources." [d. Professor Schaefer caJls such an approach the best-use value of the corpo­
ration. [d. at 1039. 
138. [d. at 1040. 
139. Professor Schaefer claims that appraisers use a best-use approach in the bank­
ruptcy context, id., but bankruptcy is not analogous because there the appraisers are trying 
to get the highest figure possible for the protection of the creditors. 
140. 12B W. FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5906.14, at 397. 
141. Note, supra note 19, at 1460 (citing American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 
629, 190 A. 225 (1937». See also American Seating Co. v. BuJlard, 290 F. 896 (6th Cir. 
1923). 
142. Contra Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L. 
REV. 117, 145-49 (1985). 
143. GaJlois v. West End Chern. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1960). 
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of property on any given date, in monetary terms, is what it can be 
sold for in a free and fair market. 144 
The California court's statement rests on the assumption of an efficient 
capital market and the efficient capital market hypothesis rests on the 
proposition "that all available, relevant information about a com­
pany's financial prospects is fully and virtually instantaneously re­
flected in the market price of the company's securities."145 While 
tremendous amounts of empirical data have been gathered in support 
of the efficient capital market hypothesis,146 recent market behavior 
has not confirmed the hypothesis. 147 For instance, throughout the 
summer of 1985, average listed stocks on the New York Stock Ex­
change were trading at about 70 per cent of their underlying asset 
144. Id. at 774, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02. 
145. Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1089-90 (1977). For 
more in-depth material regarding the efficient capital market hypothesis, see R. POSNER & 
K. SCOTT, EcONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); 
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regula­
tion ofCash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note, The Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031 (1977). 
In fact, the efficient capital market theory has influenced a number of state legislatures 
so much so that these states have amended their appraisal statutes to exclude from an 
appraisal remedy all dissenting shareholders holding shares that are traded on national 
exchanges. Such amendments are known as "stock market clauses." See, e.g., DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(2)(b) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(k)(I) (1981); Ky. REV 
STAT. ANN. § 27IA.400(3) (Cum. Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(B)(3) 
(West 1969 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. l3-A, § 908(4)(A) (1981); MICH. 
CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762(1) (1973 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. IS, § 1515(L) 
(1967 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-909(c) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10­
75(b) (1973). Most of these clauses were added to the appraisal statutes in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's. 
More recently, however, after having adopted a stock market clause in its Model Busi­
ness Corporation Act in 1969, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws eliminated the 
clause, recognizing the unreliability of the market. Conard, supra note 101. Conard stated 
that "[t]he 1970's have demonstrated again the possibility of a demoralized market in 
which fair prices are not available, and in which many companies publicly offer to buy their 
own shares because the market grossly undervalues them." Id. at 1862. Such statements 
implicitly reject the efficient capital market hypothesis. See generally, Note, A Reconsidera­
tion of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 1023 (1976). 
146. For a brief synopsis of such research, see Note, The Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1041-57 (1977). 
147. For criticisms of the efficient capital market hypothesis, see Lowenstein, Prun­
ing Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal For Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 
(1983); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles ofShareholders and Management in Modern Corporate 
Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. I, 82, 86 (1969). See also In re Valuation of Common 
. Stock of Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 60 (Me. 1979). 
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value. 148 The fair value of a business should never be less than the 
business's liquidation value. How could a truly efficient capital market 
miss the mark so widely? 
Another line of reasoning suggests that either the efficient capital 
market hypothesis is inapplicable to real market activities, or tender 
offerers are irrational in offering target shareholders a premium above 
market. 149 The fact is that tender offerers act quite rationally in offer­
ing such premiums, since the market has proved to undervalue Ameri­
can enterprise. The corollary refutes the efficient capital market 
hypothesis. 
It is true that price movements related to general economic condi­
tions may reflect the changing attitudes of investors toward the 
value of the particular company, but price changes caused by profit 
taking, by sudden buying on the strength of a rumor, or by the 
bandwagon psychology of a bull or bear market may have little to 
do with the intrinsic worth of the company. 150 
Moreover, just as the market today may undervalue businesses, it 
may as in yesteryears overvalue businesses. 151 It is fair to conclude 
that the accuracy of any market valuation technique is inevitably 
suspect. 
3. Capitalized Earnings Value 
Of the three techniques combined in the Delaware block ap­
proach, the capitalized earnings method is said to be the least objec­
tionable,152 since it most approximates the figure upon which a willing 
buyer and willing seller would agree. 153 On the contrary, the reliabil­
ity of the earnings valuation method is suspect. 
What are earnings? Accountants determine earnings by sub­
tracting all operating expenses from operating revenues. The differ­
148. Kinsley, You Won't Find an Efficient Market on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., July 
18, 1985, col. 2, at 25. The reasoning commonly given for such market behavior is the 
investing public's general feeling that management is using corporate assets inefficiently. 
Id. 
149. See Kinsley, supra note 148, at 25. 
150. Note, supra note 19, at 1464. 
151. See In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 493-94, 178 N.E. 766, 768-69 (1931); Chicago 
Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150-52, 172 A. 452, 455-56 (Ch. 1934). 
152. See 1 A. DEWING, supra note 85, at 287-88; In re Northwest Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 41 Wash. 2d 672, 680-81, 251 P.2d 607,617 (1952). But see Felder v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 89, 159 A.2d 278, 285 (1960) (earnings value cannot be the 
sole valuation method under the Delaware block approach). 
153. Note, supra note 19, 1464. 
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ence represents earnings. 154 However, under generally accepted 
accounting principles recognition of revenues and expenses is not nec­
essarily conditioned upon the actual receipt or dispersal of funds. Ac­
countants have developed a system of deferral and accrual by which 
they may more readily match revenues with the particular expenses 
that were necessary to generate those revenues during identifiable time 
periods. Essentially, the system is based on credit since accountants 
will attempt to show expenses as they are incurred and "profit as it is 
earned rather than when the company and the customer get around to 
paying their bills. "155 
The earnings figure, accordingly, is of little use in valuing corpo­
rate shares for two reasons. First, while we have noted that earnings 
represents the difference between revenues and expenses for a given 
time period, we have not yet defined the processes in which revenues 
and expenses are determined. In fact, generally accepted accounting 
principles allow for a tremendous amount of manipulation in deter­
mining the various revenue and expense account balances. For in­
stance, it is generally understood that the first-in, first-out (FIFO) 
method of inventory accounting tends to maximize the earnings figure 
during periods of rising prices. 156 Critics of the method charge that 
the difference between an earnings figure for a company using FIFO 
and an earnings figure for the same company using the average inven­
tory cost method represents nothing more than inflationary spirals in 
the marketplace rather than more efficient or more "profitable" 
operations. 157 
Critics have also charged that the last-in, first-out (LIFO) method 
of inventory accounting is suspect in that it allows management great 
room within which to manipulate its cost of goods sold closing bal­
154. D. HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 11-19 (1980). For 
purposes of this note, "earnings," "profits," and "income" are synonymous. 
Profits are not a physical "thing" that can be disposed of, retained or paid 
out. Profit is simply the name given to the change in a company's net assets that 
results from selected operating, financing and investing activities during a period 
of time. 
Heath, Let's Scrap the "Funds" Statement, 146 J. ACCOUNTANCY 94, 95 (Oct. 1978). 
155. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 83-84 (2d ed. 
1984). See also Treynor, The Trouble With Earnings, FIN. ANALYSTS J. 42 (reprinted in 
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 612, 614 (Lorie & Brealey 
eds. 1978». 
156. Statement No.6, Inventory Pricing and Changes in Price Levels, promulgated by 
the Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards of the American Accounting Asso­
ciation (reprinted in 29 Ace. REV. 188 (1954»(cited in Herwitz, supra note 154, at 454-56). 
157. [d. 
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ance. 158 Management could do so either by buying inventory that it 
does not need until the following year at the end of the year or by 
buying only as much inventory as is normally sold (not replenishing 
inventory until the following year). By buying at the end of the year 
during periods of rising prices, management can increase significantly 
the cost of its closing inventory. The value of the closing inventory, 
valued at the cost of the most recent purchases, will increase the cost 
of goods sold, thereby decreasing the firm's earnings. 159 On the other 
hand, management could decide not to repurchase or replenish inven­
tory. Instead, it could maintain a tight margin between inventory and 
sales volume so as to minimize the inventory on hand at the end of the 
year. Such a practice, known as LIFO liquidation,l60 has the effect of 
maximizing earnings. Numerous other expense accounts are likewise 
subject to manipulation. 161 
The foregoing should demonstrate that the earnings figure is very 
unreliable as an indicator of either the value of the corporation or its 
shares. 162 In short, the earnings figure "is a peculiar sort of account­
ing number that is of relatively little use. . . except for the fact that 
[the] government looks at it to calculate a corporation's tax liabil­
ity."163 But the earnings figure suffers from a second more fundamen­
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Herwitz, supra note 154, at 458. 
161. For example, the depreciation expense account is eventually subtracted from 
the overall earnings figure. This is so even though the expense account involves no cash 
disbursements: 
Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which aims to distribute 
the cost ... of tangible capital assets, less salvage (if any), over the estimated 
useful life of the unit (which may be a group of assets) in a systematic and rational 
manner. It is a process of allocation, not of valuation. 
HERWITZ, supra note 154, at 471. How fast an asset will be depreciated is largely up to 
management. The same can be said of the amortization of accounts for intangible assets. 
See PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 4, APB opinion no. 17, at 1111 27-31. In short, the 
earnings figure for any company is the bottom line figure of an income statement. Yet 
many transactions significantly affecting cash are not reflected by the income statement, 
such as borrowing, the issuance of stock, or the purchase of capital assets: 
Obviously, a company's revenues from operations are its primary source of 
cash, while its expenses are the principal cash drain; hence, estimated future earn­
ings do provide some index to expected cash resources. But this is only a starting 
point. 
HERWITZ, supra note 154, at 71. 
162. Kripke, The SEC. The Accountants. Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1151, 1176 (1970). ("Translation of financial events into a numerical system is not 
an objective perception of reality, it is rather a symbolic system devised by man. ") 
163. K. BOUDREAUX & H. LONG, THE BASIC THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 71 
(1977). 
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tal flaw as an indicator of the value of corporate shares. 
Significantly, value is always a function of return. l64 But inves­
tors will never realize a return on their investment in the form of earn­
ings.165 In fact, the accountant's earnings figure has little if any 
relationship to the real basis of the value of corporate shares. 166 A real 
return to the investor will come in the form of cash. 167 Therefore, it 
makes sense to look at a corporation's cash flow in order to value the 
dissenter's shares rather than its earnings. 168 
C. Summary 
In light of the foregoing criticism, advocates of the Delaware 
block approach nonetheless maintain that the method averages the 
three different values so as to mitigate the effects of defects inherent in 
each. 169 However, the requirement of weighting and averaging to­
gether three different values serves only to inject greater subjectivity 
164. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 86, 1-7; 1 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 13-15. 
165. K. BOUDREAUX AND H. LoNG, supra note 163, at 71. 
166. Id. 
167. Corporations don't pay dividends out of earnings, income, or profits, they pay 
them out of cash. Heath, supra note 154, at 98. "[T)he only benefit of ... securities to 
their holders will be the cash flows they are expected to return." K. BOUDREAUX AND H. 
LONG, supra note 163, at 136. Thus, one commentator, while correctly stating that "[o)ne 
of the prominent considerations of the investor is the return which he will receive," errone­
ously concluded that it is through an earnings "computation that a true measure of such a 
value may be achieved." Comment, supra note 49, at 230. 
168. K. BOUDREAUX AND H. LONG, supra note 163, at 71, 136. See infra notes 176­
86 and accompanying text. In the analogous activity of lending, the lending institution, 
too, is interested in a return on its investment. Gradually, lenders learned that such a 
return came in neither the form of earnings, nor assets (current or otherwise), nor working 
capital. Returns come in the form of cash. Heath, supra note 154, at 98-99. 
Reporting cash receipts and payments is widely advocated today by many finan­
cial statement users, particularly bankers. For example, Walter B. Wriston, [for­
merly) chairman of the board of Citibank, N.A., stated ... "When I came into 
the banking business, we were asset conscious and we loaned money on that basis. 
Well, assets give you a warm feeling, but they don't generate cash. The first ques­
tion I would ask any borrower these days is, 'What's your break even cash flow?' 
That's the one thing we can't find out from your audit reports and its the single 
most important question we ask. It's important that you figure out a way to 
present the difference between real cash flow and accrual cash flow. 
Id. at 99 (quoting a speech before an assembly of certified public accountants). The author 
contends that for much of the past forty years or so, courts and appraisers shared Mr. 
Wriston's one-time comfort in asset valuation or assessment. Such overemphasis upon the 
significance of asset value is strikingly evident in the considerable weight often borne by 
asset value in Delaware case law. See Note, supra note 71, at 641-42 for abstracts of Dela­
ware block caselaw. 
169. Consideration of at least the three factors discussed helps to minimize the effect 
of defects in anyone and to assure that no single computation will be determinative. Note, 
supra note 19, at 1468; Note, supra note 71, at 640. 
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into the valuation process than need be present. 170 The valuation of a 
going business is inherently a subjective exercise l7l because valuing a 
going concern requires conjecture in the selection of a capitalization 
multiplier. 172 Yet, the Delaware block approach opens an entirely 
separate avenue of sUbjectivity into the valuation process when it ne­
cessitates the weighting of different measures. 
While it is clear that appraisers must forever contend with subjec­
tive value judgments, the predictive worth of their endeavors pursuant 
to the Delaware block approach is tremendously undercut by having 
twice to "guesstimate" when objective standards are lacking. The 
Delaware block approach is an illusory standard. The degree of sub­
jectivity which it allows affords the opportunity for two appraisers 
working in accordance with the same "standard" and given the same 
business data to arrive at widely divergent figures. 
Moreover, courts which have used the Delaware block approach 
have consistently failed to justify mathematically compromising differ­
ent valuation measures.173 While few doubt the validity and useful­
ness of averaging identical or similar means of measurement (for 
example, averaging several thermometer readings or a law student's 
grades), most would look with skepticism on approaches which aver­
170. Note, supra note 71, at 640. 
171. R. HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 20. See Santee Oil Co., Inc. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 
270, 276, 217 S.E.2d 789, 793 (1975); Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 
471 (Del.Ch. 1975). 
172. Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 470-74 (Del.Ch. 1975). 
173. One statistician states: 
[T]he choice of a value which lies between the estimates of two different 
models, though it might appear to the layman's rough sense of compromise to be 
supported by the results of each, is in reality consistent with the assumption of 
neither, so that the compromise would lack any evidentiary support. 
Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442, 
1470 (1973). Finkelstein's objection to compromise is discussed in the more general con­
text of a decisionmaker who has been presented with conflicting economic measurements, 
the measurements themselves derived from conceptually and procedurally different models 
or methodologies. See generally id. at 1467-71. 
One critic argues that Finklestein's objection is incorrect and further, that one could 
not deduce from it the conclusion that compromising valuation methodologies is wrong. 
See Schaefer, supra note 11, at 1069-1070 & n.194. But Professor Schaefer provides no 
convincing justification for his attack on Finkelstein's theory. Instead, Schaefer reasons 
that compromises are workable and cites to the use of weighted averages in determining the 
"official international time." Id. at 1070 n.193. But Finkelstein's objection has nothing to 
do with Professor Schaefer's example of atomic clocks. Finkelstein's objection is to the 
compromising of conceptually and functionally different measures. All of the measures 
averaged in Schaefer's example come from identical means of measurement, viz., atomic 
clocks. In the Delaware block approach, to the contrary, three vastly different means of 
measurement are averaged which, conceptually, is an invalid procedure, an observation 
that has yet to be refuted. 
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age very different means of measurement. Although it is true that 
there is some overlap in such valuation techniques as assets, earnings, 
and market,174 by and large each measures different facets of a busi­
ness.175 The implication of such an observation is that an appraiser 
cannot validly average earnings, market, and asset values but must 
choose one, or some other figure, as being the valid measure. The 
critical question must be what dictates that choice. 
V. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW: AN ALTERNATIVE 
A. Toward a Purposeful and Less Subjective Valuation Methodology 
Recall that the objective of appraisal statutes is to return to the 
dissenting shareholders the cash equivalent of the investment they 
would have retained but for the event which precipitated their dis­
sent. 176 A number of courts have intimated that the value of the dis­
senter's investment approximates the amount upon which a willing 
buyer and willing seller would agree for the exchange of the dissenter's 
interest in a going concern. 177 
Given that both the willing buyer and the willing seller are pru­
dent investors, and assuming that they look largely to the same factors 
in determining the risk of investment,178 it follows that each would 
approach the transaction with roughly the same minimum rate of re­
turn necessary to induce each to transact. Of course, since both are 
prudent investors, they wish to maximize their return,179 and each will 
174. Jaques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 373, 75 A.2d 
244, 247 (1950). 
175. See Brown v. Hedahl's-Q B & R, Inc., 185 N.W.2d 249,254,258 (N.D. 1971). 
176. See, e.g., In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 310, 314, 367 P.2d 
807 (1962). 
177. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934). At any 
give moment, a business is worth what one would pay for it under conditions of equal 
bargaining power and lack of compulsion to sell. 2 BONBRIGHT, supra note 8, at 826-38. 
Such a price would obviously include future prospects. See National Bank of Commerce v. 
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 313, 315-16, 29 N.E. 532, 533 (1892). 
178. See Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 339 A.2d 460, 470-74 (DeI.Ch. 1975). 
The seller has computed his desired return at a time earlier than the transaction between 
willing seller and willing buyer; nevertheless, he now wishes to sell for no less than the 
particular price that will yield the return he still desires. If, events have transpired which 
now make the seller's original calculations of return unreasonable, he will have to recalcu­
late what he can expect to recover given the existing risk. In such an instance both buyer 
and seller would be calculating their expected rates of return, and they would be basing 
such calculations roughly on the same factors. If the risk of investment has not changed 
from the time the seller originally invested, we must assume, other things being equal, that 
the calculations of both buyer and seller will roughly approximate each other. 
179. Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth. and the Valuation ofShares, 34 
J. Bus. 411, 412-13 (Oct. 1961)(reprinted in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT 
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open with significantly different offers the willing buyer's lower since 
he wishes to reap a greater return than his minimum figure would 
allow him, the willing seller's higher for the same reason. Moreover, 
since the willing buyer/willing seller model assumes equal bargaining 
power, the mythical traders will eventually agree on a figure that ap­
proximates their roughly equivalent acceptable minimum rate of re­
turn. Thus, to figure out the "value" upon which a willing buyer and 
a willing seller would agree, one must compute the minimum rate of 
return acceptable to the prudent investor in light of the risk associated 
with investing in the particular going concern. ISO 
Again, the prudent investor is interested in a return of cash. 
Moreover, since the capitalization multiplier is the reciprocal of the 
chosen rate of return, \81 a discounted cash flow approach more di­
rectly links the rate of return desired by the prudent investor with his 
desired medium of return cash. Discounted cash flow valuation at­
tempts to predict the future cash flow of a company over a period of 
years. 
On an abstract level, one can approximate cash flow from net 
earnings. Such an approach would involve either subtracting from or 
adding to the earnings figures all transaction costs for which no cash 
actually changed hands. Cash flow represents the difference between 
cash inflow and cash outflow, a much more restrictive concept than 
earnings. For example, earnings includes accrued income for which 
no cash has been received and deferred expenses for which no cash has 
been dispersed. Thus, to compute cash flow, an appraiser would have 
to (1) add back to the earnings figure such items as depreciation and 
amortization expenses and deferred expenses for such items as income 
tax, rents, and insurance; (2) subtract from the resulting figure all ac­
crued income for which no cash was received such as receivables, and 
all cash paid out which was not accounted for as an expense under 
generally accepted accounting principles, such as capital investments 
and debt service. J82 
MANAGEMENT 508, 509 (Lorie & Brealey eds. 1978». Prudent investors are those who 
"always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to 
their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their 
holdings of shares." Id. 
180. One common means of determining risk, which is always a subjective endeavor, 
is to extrapolate from risk-free securities, such as T-bills. For example, if T-bills are cur­
rently bearing 9 percent interest, then the prudent investor would expect no less than 9 
percent on any investment involving some risk and probably much more than 9 percent for 
very risky investments. 
181. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
182. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 156, at 83-84; Haynsworth, Valuation 
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For the same reasons that one would want to use a five-year 
weighted average figure in the capitalized earnings method,183 one 
would do well to do the same in determining net cash flow. After 
calculating a weighted average cash flow, the resulting figure will be 
capitalized through the use of a multiplier. 184 
However, it must be emphasized that little, if any, relationship 
exists between cash flow and earnings. 18s The means used above to 
distinguish cash flow from earnings does not represent a practical 
means for deriving a cash flow figure, since one would have to work 
with the very expense accounts that were found to be dubious indica­
tors of financial reality. 186 Nonetheless, the discounted cash flow valu­
ation technique represents a valid and accurate means of valuing the 
dissenter's shares. It sports the appealing feature of minimizing sub­
jectivity and, in fact, necessitates far fewer subjective judgments on the 
part of the appraiser than does the Delaware block. Even more desira­
ble, the technique focuses on the value of the dissenting shareholder's 
foregone investment precisely the measure the appraiser statutes seek 
to establish. 
B. 	 Toward a Disclosure System Which Provides Readily Obtainable 
Valuation Information 
Unfortunately, current SEC disclosure provisions do not require 
management to publish the financial data necessary to compute actual 
cash flows. 187 How, then, is an appraiser to determine the value of 
corporate shares based on cash flow? While the dissenter should be 
able to obtain copies of a firm's actual cash receipts and proof of ex-
ofBusiness Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 478-79 & n.56 (1982). It is also important 
to note that current SEC disclosure provisions do not require management to publish the 
necessary financial data with which to compute cash flow. Kripke, Fifty Years ofSecurities 
Regulation in Search ofa Purpose, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257,266-67 & nn.29-32 (1984). 
183. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
185. K. BOUDREAUX AND H. LONG, supra note 163, at 71. Realizing the shortcom­
ings of the earnings statement as an indicator of cash flow, the Accounting Principles 
Board advocated the presentation of a Statement of Changes in Financial Position to better 
represent a company's flow of funds. PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 4, APB Opinion No. 
3 (1963). Eight years later, the APB required the publication of a "funds" statement as a 
matter of generally accepted accounting principles. PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 4, 
APB Opinion No. 19, at ~ 7 (1971). Yet the APB allowed "funds" to mean not only cash 
but working capital. Id. at ~ 10. Such a provision renders the statement useless as a mea­
sure of cash flow. See Heath, supra note 154, at 97-100. 
186. 	 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text. 
187. Kripke, supra note 182, at 266-67 & nn. 29-32. See also Heath, supra note 154, 
at 99 (recommending the required presentation of a Statement of Cash Receipts and 
Payments). 
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penditures, it will be the court or appraisers, independent of the par­
ties, who will value the shares. The appraisers should be able to obtain 
access to such information through the general subpoena powers of 
the court, from which the appraiser's authority is derived. Moreover, 
the SEC, under its extensive rulemaking authority, should require the 
publication of actual cash flow figures in the Securities Act of 1933 
registration statements188 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pe­
riodic reporting documents, such as the Form 10K and Form lOQ.189 
The accounting and financial records that the SEC currently requires 
were never meant, either by the companies which maintain them or 
the SEC which requires their disclosure, to be indicative of value. 
Rather, companies kept such information as a means of recording fis­
cal transactions and business performance. 190 In at least one case, the 
SEC maintained that a cash flow valuation would be more meaningful 
than an earnings valuation, since the latter would be distorted by ac­
crual accounting techniques. 191 It is hoped that, in time, indepen­
dently audited cash flow statements192 will serve as reliable indicators 
of value and will obviate the need for courts and appraisers to sift 
through mountains of paper in order to value corporate shares. 
The final capitalized or discounted cash flow figure more accu­
rately predicts the worth of a going concern than does the Delaware 
block approach or any of its constituent valuation methods, including 
the earnings approach. Not only does net cash flow depict the future 
availability of the object that the shareholder desires (which an earn­
ings valuation does not), but it does so with less resort to sUbjective 
judgment. For example, cash flow ignores such matters as deprecia­
tion, amortization, deferral, and accrual, all of which necessitate con­
jecture. It further eliminates the need to weight variables, a practice 
that unnecessarily accentuates the sUbjective character of appraisal 
valuation. 
In all fairness, however, one should not assume that cash flow 
valuation eliminates sUbjectivity entirely, for that would be impossible. 
188. 15 U.S.c. § 77(a), 77(t)-(h) (1982); 17 C.F.R. sec. 230.400 -230.494 (1985). 
189. 15 U.S.c. § 78(a), 78(m) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a (1985). 
190. Banks, supra note 89, at 2 (1974). Accounting is the art of recording business 
transactions, not valuing them. Id. 
191. In re Jade Oil & Gas Co., Great Lakes Gas Corp., S.E.C. Corporate Reorgani­
zation Release No. 289, at 10 (Sept. 15, 1969)(cited in Blum, Corporate Reorganizations 
Based on Cash Flow Valuations, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1970». 
192. These would be statements different from the Statement of Changes in Financial 
Position currently required by the SEC for Exchange Act reporting companies in that it 
would not be based on traditional "expenses" accounts. For a rigorous criticism of the 
"Funds" Statement, see Heath, supra note 154. 
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In any appraisal proceeding, the appraiser looks not to current value 
alone, but to a foregone investment in a going concern. Thus, the ap­
praiser will inevitably render personal judgments as to the predictabil­
ity of future occurrences. The valuation process is based more on 
conjecture than on mathematical precision and is, therefore, enor­
mously subjective. 193 The objective of the discounted cash flow 
method is to limit the appraisal process's sUbjective taint as much as 
possible. 
C. The Fate of the Delaware Block Approach 
While courts are liberalizing their appraisal valuation standards 
by allowing the use of valuation methods other than the Delaware 
block approach, they refuse to reject the Delaware block approach. 194 
It is entirely possible that courts never will reject the approach ex­
pressly but, instead, will look to other methods, such as discounted 
cash flOW,195 as their accuracy and validity are established. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts have used the Delaware block approach for decades. 
Since the approach's inception, courts and commentators seldom have 
justified either its use or its validity. Recently, however, the Delaware 
block approach has come under fire, both from courts and academi­
cians. Some have argued weakly that the technique values a company 
at less than its asset value and fails to consider relevant factors other 
than assets, earnings, and market values. However, the technique has 
far greater problems. First, it calls for the compromising of three dif­
ferent valuation techniques a requirement invalid in itself. Second, the 
193. R. HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 20. One commentator criticizes the Delaware 
block approach for requiring the appraiser to look backward at historical values in order to 
value an enterprise. Comment, supra note 142, at 139. Yet all methods of valuing going 
concerns succumb to this criticism. While the commentator is correct in asserting that the 
discounted cash flow "value of a share of stock . . . is the present value of the future 
benefits to be received from ownership," id. at 132, it is erroneous to suggest that the dis­
counted cash flow method avoids the procedure of looking backward. A reliable dis­
counted cash flow valuation requires the appraiser to compute present and past cash flows 
regardless of whether he uses receipts and dispursment slips or dividends, see id. at 131-35, 
as his Object of measure. Only after the appraiser has determined past and present meas­
ures of value may he begin to measure the future worth of the enterprise. The process is 
known as discounting or capitalizing and is used in both the Delaware block approach and 
the discounted cash flow method. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
195. See e.g. Dermody v. Sticco, 191 N.J.Super. 192, 197-98, 465 A.2d 948, 951 
(Ch.Div. 1983); In re Jade Oil & Gas Corp., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 
289, at 10 (Sept. IS, 1969)(cited in Blum, supra note 191). 
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accuracy and validity of each of the constituent valuation methods em­
ployed by the Delaware block approach is suspect, as is any approach 
that depends on such methods. Moreover, better alternatives than the 
Delaware block approach exist. Discounted cash flow valuation repre­
sents a technique that is both less SUbjective and more representative 
of the interests of a prudent investor. 
William S. Allred* 
• The author would like to thank Professors Joseph Basile and Robert Titus of 
Western New England College School of Law and his colleague Peter Carroll for their 
invaluable assistance and commentary. Special thanks and recognition go to Professors 
Basile and Titus, who so graciously offered their time and concern to help nurture the 
author's interest in the corporate law. 
